Ingarden’s Concept of Film Art

Abstract
The article discusses two texts by Roman Ingarden on film: a short excerpt “The Cinematographic Drama (The Film)” from his book The Literary Work of Art (1931), and a longer sketch Kilka uwag o sztuce filmowej [Some Remarks on Film Art], published separately in 1947. In both texts, the film work is described within the whole system of the phenomenological theory of art. It is compared to other works (e.g., theatre or painting), and above all to literature, with which it shares the characteristics of layering and intentionality. Stefan Morawski reconstructs this system and then considers the place of Ingarden’s reflection on film against the background of the world theory of his time. Morawski concludes that while it lacks originality, it has significantly influenced the development of film studies (especially in Poland) and remains inspirational for further research. (Non-reviewed material; originally published in Kwartalnik Filmowy 1958, no. 32, pp. 17–32).

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Roman Ingarden; history of film theory; phenomenology; aesthetics; film specificity; comparative studies
Roman Ingarden, one of the leading contemporary philosophers and aestheticians, wrote about film art twice: in 1931 and in 1947. In the first case, his remarks on film were a side note to his reflections on the structure and existence of a literary work; in the second case, they constitute an autonomous essay. One could approach the problem posed in the title of this article in three ways. Firstly, one could analyse the author’s specific theses from 1931 and 1947 and confront them with his general aesthetic concept, demonstrating to what extent he draws inspiration from it and to what extent from the development of film art itself. Or, secondly, Ingarden’s thoughts on the peculiarity of film art could be analysed against the background of the considerations of his contemporaries, both in Poland and abroad. Finally, it is possible to construct certain basic theses of film aesthetics, based on Ingarden’s enquiries into non-film art. This would serve as a supplement to the author’s own remarks, justified by the fact that he himself treated his statements about film art himself as propaedeutic. The most proper thing would be to undertake all three tasks outlined here. However, this would require extensive study. Therefore, I will limit myself here to the second task, introducing the others only in passing. I justify this decision by the nature of *Kwartalnik filmowy* [Film Quarterly] as well as by the importance of the issue of film art in Ingarden’s analyses. For all the author’s inquiries, both comparative (film vs. other arts) and those concerning the analysis of the film work itself, aim at solving this very problem.

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Before proceeding with Ingarden’s remarks on film art, I will, out of necessity, dwell on some of his general aesthetic theses. Without knowing them, it is impossible to understand his detailed considerations.

Artistic works, according to Ingarden, have a layered structure. He distinguishes the following layers in a literary work: a) verbal sounds, b) meanings (sentence senses), c) schematised appearances through which the depicted objects manifest themselves, d) depicted objects, determined by sentence senses. Layer (b) is the primary component here. In a work of pictorial art, only the last two layers can be distinguished, and unlike a work of literature, it is a momentary creation, devoid of the passage of time. Ingarden also distinguishes two layers in architecture and sculpture: visual appearances and three-dimensional shape (an objective solid). Unlike a painting, it is not the appearance, but the shape of the solid that is the primary component here. In a musical work, there is only one layer: the sounds.

How, then, is the concept of ‘layers’ to be understood? In his discussion with Nicolai Hartmann, Ingarden explains that, in his opinion, the ‘layer’ does not function as the existential basis for other phenomena (such as a picture for a painting or a score for a piece of music) but is a component of the work of art itself. Already in his first work on aesthetics, Ingarden argued that layers as components are characterised by their distinctive material and their distinctive role in the construction of the whole. They are clearly visible (sichtbar) and for this reason they give rise to the polyphonic values of a given
work. In his later work entitled “The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity,” Ingarden pointed out, among other things, that one can only speak of a multi-layered structure of a work of art when a) there are diverse components in it; b) the homogeneous components form ensembles of a higher order (e.g. words – sentences); c) the basic components are distinct parts of a whole and at the same time d) they form an organic whole of a single work. Ingarden usually very strongly emphasised this last aspect.

The second fundamental assumption of Ingarden’s aesthetics is the intentional nature of the work of art. This concerns its existence, while layering concerned its structure. What does it mean that a work of art is intentional? Using the example of a literary work, the author argued in his *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (vol. XIV) that it is neither physical, nor mental, nor psychophysical. He developed and deepened this argumentation in such works as *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* [Studying a Literary Work] (1937) and in *Szkice z filozofii literatury* [Sketches on the philosophy of literature] (1947). As he wrote, books are bound sheets of paper filled with marks or drawings constituting only a means of physical recording of a literary work. What readers experience are their personal “concretisations” of a literary work, i.e. the additions and transformations made to it in a variety of ways. The literary work itself is an intentional object, i.e. it has its source of existence in the writer’s creative acts and, thanks to the layer of meaning, forms a separate, intersubjective entity. Objects that we perceive in our everyday experience are something external to our consciousness and are given to us as real phenomena. Intentional objects, on the other hand, are constructed by words that mean something; and because they mean something, they produce creations that remain objective in relation to experiences, yet, at the same time, derivative in relation to the processes taking place in our consciousness. Thus, the layer of signification designates objects that are neither real nor ideal; based on it, the readers constitute their own appearances, people, events. However, in comparison with real ones, these are always ‘schematised,’ i.e. they do not exhaust the infinite multiplicity of their features and states. Therefore, while reading a literary work, there is a process of specifying these appearances or objects. The phenomenon of the ‘underdetermination’ of an artistic work is supposed to result precisely from its intentional existence – from the side of both the creator and the recipient. In the analysis of a painting, which is devoid of a verbal layer, this very feature of underdetermination becomes the main evidence of intentional existence; whereas in the analysis of architecture, intentionality is evidenced by the fact that it is the product of acts of consciousness (e.g. a building becomes a church due to a religious cult). Here we also learn that the schematic (and at the same time the underdetermined places) does not belong to the essence of a work of art. Finally, in the analysis of a musical work, Ingarden talks about intentionality since this work is determined by the author’s creative acts, that it is something supra-individual, which cannot be reduced either to individual performances or to perceptions.

As can be seen from this brief review, Ingarden’s statements about the intentional nature of artistic works are not fully consistent. It seems that his recent chronological analysis, concerning the properties of a musical work, should be taken as a starting point. Ingarden explains it in it that:
intentional objects are the product of creative, conscious acts, and therefore do not exist autonomously like real objects;

therefore, they cannot be identified either with physical objects or with mental phenomena, since the latter are merely the basis for the existence of the latter;

works of art are precisely such objects, which cannot be reduced to a painting, a score, a book, a script, etc., or to the experiences of the artist or the audience. Realistically, there are psycho-physical entities (people) and objects made of paper, canvas, marble, etc. However, intentionally, there are intersubjective creations, dependent on the consciousness of the artist and the audience.

Ingarden refuses to call the view thus articulated idealistic. He claims that from recognising the intentionality of works of art there follows, by inversion, a thesis recognising the reality of the objects of the surrounding world. However, if Ingarden can defend himself against the charge of philosophical idealism, it is from aesthetic enquiries into the structure and existence of the work of art that he derives a thesis that appears to be thoroughly idealistic. He argues, quite clearly, that all works of art are something irreal, i.e. the category of truth cannot be applied to any of them. Even in a literary work, the objects presented do not reproduce genuine reality. They remain indep endent here since they are designated intentionally. The author constituted them not by reproducing the world known to us from everyday experience, but by names and their meanings.

If there is no verbal or semantic layer, then irrealism results from the intersubjectivity of a given work of art, i.e. from conscious, productive or receiving acts that give it existence and meaning.

In a treatise entitled “O tak zwanej prawdzie w literaturze” [“On the So-Called Truth in Literature”], Ingarden explained in more detail that the declarative sentences contained in a literary work are only quasi-affirmative, i.e. they are never judgements in the strict meaning of the word. They are the very foundation of artistic fiction. Intentionality – as Ingarden demonstrates on the example of his analysis of poetry – presupposes fiction, since what is presented or expressed in it remains determined by the word-meaning text.

A work of art, as it seems from his analysis of aesthetic experience, does not fulfil a cognitive function in the sense that it directs the recipient’s consciousness towards reality. It serves only to evoke emotion and to enable a direct contact with certain valuable sets of sensory and emotional qualities. Thus, we can only speak of artistic ‘truth’ from the point of view of the intrinsic ‘object consequence’ of a work, but never from the point of view of the relation of that work to the real world.

From these three discussed assumptions, Ingarden derived the properties of individual arts. It turns out that not all works of art have a multi-layered structure, and even those that fulfil this criterion have more or fewer layers, and a different one plays the dominant role at any given time. Furthermore, the structure of a work is determined by its dynamic, temporal, or static, spatial organisation. Although every work is an intentional object, its real foundation may be more or less distinct. It is true that irrealism characterises all works of art, but in some of them real elements can be found; even in literary works there are judgments that speak directly about the real world.
Leaving aside the problem of the truthfulness of Ingarden’s general arguments, let us move on to his statements about film art. The subject of Ingarden’s remarks in 1931, excluding other specific issues, is the structure of a film work. The problem of structure is considered in relation to silent cinema. The point of departure is the finished spectacle, not the technical/artistic process underlying it. Ingarden’s remarks can be put into the following theses:

1) Cinema as an intentional creation presents various reconstructed visual aspects of objects or situations, while showing them in a processual manner as events. Cinema is thus a temporal construct. This aspect distinguishes it from painting; and from literature in that it is devoid of a verbal/sonic layer of words and meaning. It is, in Ingarden’s conclusion, a degenerate form of theatre (ein entartetes Theaterstück); it is degenerate because objects are not given here in reality, but by appearances, and because it is silent, which, in turn, makes it like pantomime.

2) However, it is not the number of layers, but the dominant of these reconstructed appearances that determines the peculiarity of film art. They are schematised differently than in a literary work – the concreteness of the images, their stereoscopic nature gives them a starker appearance of reality. The dominance of this very layer results in the dimming of intellectual functions, while emotions and passions, expressed in a primitive way with the language of mimicry and gesture, are emphasised.

3) These shortcomings, compared to other arts, are in fact an advantage of film art which simply shows other aspects of existence. Its specific elements are all tangible visual events (sichtbare Geschehnisse), whose meaning, owing to various perspectives, can be emphasised or diminished.

4) Abstract cinema ceases to be film art because, despite the dominance of the layer of appearances, a layer of depicted objects is also necessary here. Cinema is only art if the objects depicted are quasi-real, or, in other words, intentional. This means that they only play the ‘part’ of real people, things, events. By contrast, in a science film or a newsreel, the objects are not presented as real, they are simply real.

The views on cinema expressed in 1931 stemmed from Ingarden’s general aesthetic concept; as far as the theoretical film literature was concerned, he referred exclusively to Konrad Lange and to Karol Irzykowski. Ingarden acknowledged, to the latter, that he had captured the essential content of cinema by bringing appearances to the fore; and it was with the latter that he engaged in a dispute arguing that not movement alone, but any event is the specificity of film, and that abstract cinema is contradictory to the essence of this art. Although glimpses of Irzykowski’s ideas are visible in Ingarden’s comments, there was another more important factor common to both: the fact that their analysis was based on silent cinema of the time.

The situation changed in 1947 when Ingarden wrote a special article entitled “Temps, Espace et Réalité” and published it in the Revue Internationale de Filmologie (no. 2). The subject matter is expanded, detailed issues are raised, the aesthetician quotes specific works in support of his proposals. Finally, and most
significantly, he bases his arguments on sound film material. However, some of the old theses are retained. Thus:

– Ingarden similarly explains the difference between film art and informational film, i.e. he contrasts the appearance of reality with reality itself. Despite the imposing reality of the people and things depicted in a feature film, they are only phantoms, since the appearances through which they are given are **deformed**.

– Similarly, he defines the place of film art among the other arts. It stands, as he writes, on the borderline between literature, painting, theatre, pantomime and music; it contains temporal and spatial, representing and non-representing elements. Therefore, the polyphony of factors here is particularly difficult and complicated.

– Finally, he similarly defines the dominance of the film spectacle, stating that here **everything should be shown explicitly in the appearances, or made explicit in the visual or audio material, delivered by the behaviour of the persons portrayed**. And that these appearances are mobile, since cinema has a temporal structure.

In addition to these old assumptions, new proposals appear, either expanding the comments from 1931 or introducing points not included there. Namely:

1) Ingarden defines specific properties of film art by comparing it to a sequence of images, which he calls ‘literary.’ Such an image contains three components: a) a layer of reconstructed appearances, b) a layer of presented objects and c) a specific life situation (event). Obviously, a painting is devoid of phases, while a film develops a narrative in time.

2) Language (speech) in film art is only an auxiliary means in relation to appearances. This aspect significantly distinguishes a film spectacle from a theatrical spectacle. Ingarden, because of this thesis, questions the presence of a voice narrator in film art who does not belong to the world presented in it. In his opinion, the ‘cinematic’ word is only a supplement to the gesture, i.e. it expresses as in real life situations, a mental event, behaviour, etc. It is best if it does not draw attention to itself at all. Speech, however, is an essential element. If we want to show the interplay between people, then by necessity the word must also occur. A completely silent film is only suitable for the portrayal of solitary humans or extra-human phenomena.

3) Analysing the temporal span of the cinematic spectacle (i.e. the appearances, sounds, etc. as well as the world depicted in the artistic work), Ingarden concludes that it is organised like a piece of music. What is this phenomenon of ‘musicality’ about? It boils down to the fact that, through the selection and sequence of the arrangement of certain elements or their ensembles, a film work acquires certain rhythmic qualities, an increase or release of tempo, an accumulation or retardation of action. Music, therefore, is necessary for a film because it intensifies its internal ‘musical’ rhythm.

4) Film art, operating in concrete space, achieves effects unattainable in other arts owing to temporal dynamics. Ingarden writes that no other art can show the fate of a human being so entangled in concrete time and pace like film.

The 1947 sketch ends with a praise of cinema as an art of exuberant artistic possibilities and, at the same time, great dangers resulting from the fact of team-
work. This sketch and the one from 1931 essentially accept film as an art and attempt to delineate its specific characteristics. Having confronted both Ingarden’s statements, these characteristics can be reduced to the following:

A) Cinema is first and foremost an art of visibility with a dynamic structure.

B) Cinema creates a greater semblance of the reality of the world depicted than any other representational art. This is due, among other things, to the fact that it uses so-called images with a literary theme and shows human beings in concrete space-time situations.

C) Cinema’s feature, both in terms of content and form, is the co-occurrence of elements belonging to many other arts. This borderline of arts appearing in the film makes it particularly polyphonic.

Of the old theses, only the one that proclaimed the absolute purity of silent cinema has disappeared in 1947. Its modified continuation is the thesis on the dominance of visual aspects, which the word serves as it does in its natural circumstances. Another former thesis, of abstract cinema as an already extra-filmic art, has not been explicitly upheld, but Ingarden does not seem to have changed his mind in this respect. Indeed, in 1947 he analysed film altogether as a representational art. Other theses from 1931 were either broadened and deepened (e.g. that film is an art only as an intentional object) or supplemented (on the temporal and spatial organisation of a film work).

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Ingarden’s proposals need to be double-checked: in relation to the development of theoretical film thought and from the point of view of their compatibility with film art itself. The first question could be formulated as follows: (1) Were Ingarden’s concepts original, and if so, to what extent, at the time he wrote them? It thus concerns the possible historical value of his theses as a stimulus for further discussion and exploration. The second question, concerning the veracity of his theses, would have to be formulated as follows: (2) Is it really the case that the peculiarity of art in general is based on its layered structure and intentional existence, and of film art in particular on the characteristics proposed by Ingarden? Let us try and answer both questions posed.

1) In the 1920s, Polish aesthetic thought in film was more advanced than our film industry output. In Western Europe, theories were developed, based on, or at the same time as, the film works that had already been made; the opposite was true in our country: theory worked, as it were, on the fly. Irzykowski’s book was a work of a European format, and if it had been translated into foreign languages – Balázs, Epstein, Dulluc, Dulac, Eisenstein and Pudovkin would have found in its author a worthy partner. Some of Epstein’s concepts were taught and popularised by Leon Trystan in our country. Tadeusz Peiper also alluded to the views of the French avant-garde. Stefania Zahorska took up the formal issues of film. Quantitatively it was a small body of work, but qualitatively it was significant and intense. Almost all the basic theses brought by foreign theorists at the time and concerning the specificity of film art were either literally repeated in Poland or modified in repetition. The rapid development of silent film led
to spontaneous generalisations underlining its difference from other arts. All the manifestos of the time, all the articles and books emphasised the element of dynamic visuality as a dominant feature in film. There were, of course, differences between the various theories: movement was understood either as an element predominantly within a frame, or as a predominantly montage element; visibility was supposed to reveal either human or non-human, cosmic things; a physical or spiritual sense was to be found in the material of cinema; images were supposed to be ‘pure,’ equipped with their own rhythm, their own architecture (this tendency tended towards the abstract film), or their rhythm was to be determined by the narrative. There was also another special feature frequently emphasised at the time: the irrationality of film art. Its sources were seen in the fact that film art slows down or prolongs down real time, that it shows the micro-physiognomy of phenomena and micro-dramas that escape everyday attention, that it subjectivises the presented content forcing the viewer to identify with the protagonist. Finally, most theoretical statements about film made at the time had a sensualist slant, i.e. this art was treated as anti-intellectual. Cinema was supposed to be an element of heightened lyricism, sensitivity and primitive reactions. This very feature was meant to testify to the autonomy of cinema.

In the following years, Polish film studies developed, among others, under the influence of Ingarden. The two most important works at that time: Zofia Lissa’s book Muzyka i film [Music and Film] (Lviv 1937) and Bolesław Lewicki’s dissertation entitled Budowa utworu filmowego [The Structure of a Film Work] (Warsaw 1935) were based on phenomenological assumptions. Lissa, adopting the thesis of reconstructed appearances as the dominant feature of cinema, analysed various acoustic structures in relation to the different layers of a film work in an original way. In her remarks on the role of speech, the coincidence of musical runs and the rhythm of film images, she anticipated Ingarden’s 1947 considerations. Lewicki, based on Das literarische Kunstwerk, attempted to expand the concept of the structure of a film work. It is significant that he introduced into his considerations an aspect that Ingarden had omitted: montage. In it, and not in the layer of appearances, Lewicki sought the main distinguishing feature of film art. His attempts came from the then contemporary trends in Polish film thought. After the period of enchantment with the French avant-garde, it was the turn of Soviet inspirations. They related to the social aspirations of the ‘Start’ group, i.e. artists and intellectuals interested in liberating art from commercial constraints.
and directing it towards social issues. Prior to Lewicki, the issue of montage had been comprehensively analysed by Eugeniusz Cękalski; Jerzy Toeplitz also wrote about it extensively many times before and after.

Film theory, in the period of those sixteen years that separate Ingarden’s two statements on film, developed, perhaps, not so rapidly, but clearly in the direction of intellectual cinema. The introduction of sound, the influence of Soviet film art on major world production, the rise of a populist direction in France\textsuperscript{28}, the emergence of the documentary school in England – these were the elements that led theorists to abandon metaphysics and speculation in favour of empirical research. Film theory was no longer concerned with the ‘magic of the screen,’ nor was it looking for evidence of a surrealist conception of the world on the screen, nor was it impressed with the ‘optical pandemonium,’ but rather studied the specific components of a work, its perception and the social conditions that caused its success or failure. A typical example of this contemporary development of theoretical issues can be seen in Balázs’s 1929 book (*Der Geist des Films*), in which the motif of man and human affairs is already prominent. It is not the form itself, but the content of the film work that is the starting point of his reflections on montage. The most significant book from those breakthrough years, when the dispute between advocates of silent and sound cinema was taking place, is Rudolf Arnheim’s *Film als Kunst*. In this book, published in 1933, the author (a disciple of the ‘Gestaltists’ – Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler) analysed primarily the artistic technique and perception mechanism of a film work. He pointed out, in his discussion with Pudovkin, that the peculiarity of film art cannot be reduced to montage alone. According to Arnheim, it begins with a single shot which is by no means an automatic activity. It creates a three-dimensional space in a two-dimensional flat image, selects objects, and emphasises their appropriate features or details through close-up or distance. Arnheim’s systematisation of the principles of montage discusses in detail the problems of film ‘space-time.’ Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Epstein and Balázs had already written extensively about it before. Arnheim analysed the dynamics of a film work in detail in “Movement” (*Enciclopedia del Cinema*) in 1934 and in the treatise “The New Laocoön” (*Bianco e Nero*) in 1938 he considered the question of sound film in confrontation with silent film, theatre, opera and painting. The results of his considerations were rather pessimistic. He believed the introduction of the spoken word had destroyed authentic film art; while the one that had been born was already a new artistic genre, close to theatre, even though it was dominated by the moving image.\textsuperscript{29} Balázs reacted similarly to the introduction of sound into film. Eisenstein and Pudovkin had already spoken of the proper subservient function of sound in relation to the image. It seems, therefore, that Ingarden’s 1947 sketch did not discover new horizons either. The only new thing was the thesis (formulated in a way that was at odds with his other theses) that music organises the temporal character of a film spectacle. Ingarden probably did not treat it as a thesis on the specific properties of film art, since in these considerations he juxtaposed it with music. But it must be questioned even in this juxtaposition and in this form. However, a film work itself has a temporal organisation resulting from its own “grammar.” Ingarden himself was inclined to this approach in 1931 and repeated it in some of his remarks in 1947. Unfortu-
nately, even if this thesis can be considered new it cannot be assigned a positive value. The first International Congress of Filmology was held in Paris that year, a science that has truly developed multifaceted, in-depth study of the “Tenth Muse.” The ideas that came out of this new discipline were brought by Gilbert Cohen-Séat in his book *Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma. Introduction générale: notions fondamentales et vocabulaire de filmologie* (1945). For it marked a *multifaceted* study of the peculiarities of film art from the technical, psychological, sociological, cultural and aesthetic angles. Ingarden, of course, had neither the intention nor the aspiration to set the agenda for filmological research.

He had other, more modest ambitions, since he was concerned with film art only from the point of view of his own, undoubtedly original conception of the artistic work. However, in assessing *historically* his contribution to film aesthetics, we are forced to juxtapose his ideas with the theoretical attempts that preceded him and were contemporary with him. It turns out that such a juxtaposition is not favourable to Ingarden. As far as the theoretical and film-related remarks in his papers are concerned, others have gone ahead of him, arguing and developing them against a broader background. The situation is different with his own philosophical-aesthetic ideas that were applied to the film and with his theses regarding the specificity of this art. These require a separate analysis. So let us turn to the second question just posed.

2) I have already made some critical remarks concerning Ingarden’s basic aesthetic assumptions in the article that was published in *Nowa Kultura* [New Culture]. Some of them will have to be recalled here, while expanding the former argumentation.

First, the layered structure of an artistic work in Ingarden’s interpretation does not seem clear. ‘Layers’ are the components of a work distinguished by their material and role. Yet, the material is one thing and the role played in the piece is another. Therefore, the distinguishing features are not uniform – the role of a given ingredient in each film is determined by a multitude of factors, and the material is determined by the artistic genre. ‘Layers’ are supposed to be either diverse or homogeneous components. Again, this notion is questionable. In the first sense (heterogeneous components), layers can be understood as parts of a whole that complement each other in the same way as, for example, the head, torso, arms, legs on the human body. In the second sense (homogeneous components), these are parts that overlap, such as the layers of human skin. What about the structure of an artistic work? Do certain elements appear next to each other, are they so intertwined that they overlap, or do they appear in yet another way?

The layers distinguished by Ingarden in the literary work do not exist. However, we cannot talk about their co-occurrence, since words by denoting, signifying and expressing something allow us to experience certain events in which the people and things involved always look one way or another. These layers, at best, can be isolated *ex post* in the analytical process, by making an abstract ‘selection’ on a living artistic work. However, one could talk about layers as components functioning next to each other, e.g. if descriptions of nature were separated from narrative fragments, and these, in turn, from dialogues. But it would be a mechanical division and that is not what Ingarden was thinking about.
In light of these considerations, it seems that it is not possible to separate three layers in a film work: appearances, depicted objects and events. In this film genre there are only depicted objects, which obviously look a certain way and create certain situations and events. But there is no reason or need to multiply entities by stating the separate existence of appearances or events, as these are related to and dependent on the objects. If one were to accept Ingarden’s proposal, one would also, for example, have to distinguish the layer of movements, instead of talking about the dynamic visuality of film images. The layered division can only be maintained if we separate the components that are diverse in terms of their material: visual, auditory, verbal. Then these three layers could be examined from the point of view of their interrelationships and the organic totality of the film spectacle. The layered structure of a feature, but silent film would be different. There would then be only one layer: the visual. This layer in a silent, abstract film would have been reduced to mere appearances. Such a layering scheme would make it possible to grasp the differences between the different film genres and to designate more precisely the place of film art among the other arts. Such genres do not seem to exist in Ingarden’s conception. Abstract cinema, for example, is removed from the category of film without sufficient argumentation.

The difficulties posed by the application of Ingarden’s layers to film art are outlined by Lewicki in his 1935 dissertation. Two divisions of cinematic elements intersect in it. In chapter II we read after CękalSKI that the components of a film are sets and episodes. This idea returns later in chapter VII in the analysis of montage as a cinematic language. By contrast, in chapter IV there is a new division according to Ingarden’s scheme with the difference that a third layer is added: cinematic language. These divisions are not set in relation to each other, which causes significant difficulties in understanding the structure of a film work. The layers are supposed to be elements of “artistic material,” while the sets and episodes are supposed to be “mechanical particles.” Lewicki correctly points out that there are different layers in different film genres (e.g. feature and abstract), but he does not draw conclusions from this fact. If he did, he would have to – as I have just argued – define the notion of layer differently from Ingarden. He had every basis for doing so, since he discussed the interdependence of visual, aural and verbal layers. There is no place for montage in Ingarden’s division, while Lewicki was forced to introduce this aspect. From Eisenstein and Pudovkin onwards, theoretical reflections on the structure of a film work moved, quite understandably from the point of view of artistic practice, not towards artificial divisions into appearance and depicted objects, but towards analyses of film grammar.

Nor does the thesis of the intentionality of artistic works seem correct. Agreeing with Ingarden that these works cannot be reduced to either physical or mental phenomena, one cannot see sufficient reason to regard their existence as unreal in the sense Ingarden ascribes to them. The fact that an artistic work is given intersubjectively does not indicate the existence of any additional intentional entity. All cognitively available phenomena exist intersubjectively, that is due to the convergence of conscious acts occurring in different individuals. There are also real objects which, according to Ingarden, are not intentional ex definitione. Acts of creation (of the artist) and acts of reception (of the
reader, viewer, listener) can be explained using psychological analyses. They are not the ones that seem to give artistic works a separate existence. Their separate existence can only be explained in a socio-historical way. An image is something different from a painting and its concretisation in the experience of recipient ‘X’ or recipient ‘Y’ because it is a cultural creation. The existence of cultural objects cannot be explained by phenomenological analysis, reducing them to intentional existence. Using Ingarden’s example, a church is a church, and not just a building in general, because a specific function has been assigned to it for historically determined social reasons. These reasons constitute the basis for the formation, perpetuation and transformation of cultural values.

Looking at a feature film, I recognise in it certain objects or people in motion, situated in spatiotemporal arrangements, experiencing this or that, because these people or objects signify or express something familiar to me from everyday reality. I can reduce the separate existence of this work, which is not reality itself but a deformed reflection, to a mere cultural function. This means that certain phenomena, i.e. experiences and artistic operations (script, screenplay, director, composer, cinematographer, etc.) have led to the creation of a work that presents something in the visual layer, signifies something in the verbal layer, and expresses something in the sound layer. No new “entity” has been created here in human consciousness: only a new social phenomenon has been created based on a new (physical) thing, causing in turn new psychological phenomena (the experience of the audience).

The problem, of course, requires further clarification. Namely, how does it come about that we treat a “moving photograph” of people or objects as a fragment of a three-dimensional reality with living people and authentic objects? This is a question to be considered within the framework of a theory of cognition. However, the results of this consideration cannot change the thesis put forward here that the existence of the work is socio-cultural and is based on the physical existence of books, paintings, filmstrips, etc., as well as the existence of the creators and audiences equipped with certain psychic properties: namely responding to stimuli from sensing and understanding. Although, like Ingarden, Stephen Cobum Pepper opposes reducing a work of art to its physical existence, he does not speak of any intentional entities, but instead analyses the experiences of the viewer and the cultural sense of the work.33

The thesis of the intentional existence of art serves Ingarden as the basis for another thesis: that of the irrealism of artistic works. While Ingarden accepts the mechanism of fiction, i.e. the assumption of quasi-real elements as real, he ascribes a different sense to it than is usually the case. After all, one cannot reasonably state that fictional characters appear in a literary work without relating them to reality. Fiction and reality are concepts that condition each other here. Meanwhile, in Ingarden’s conception, the work of art does not remain in any relation to objective reality; it remains autonomous in relation to it. Instead, it stays in close relation to the subjective reality of the creator or the viewers; it is precisely heteronomous in relation to it. For fiction is supposed to arise from intentionality and not from the confrontation of the represented world with the real world.
This is an artificially constructed thesis that makes it impossible to consider the content of a work in relation to the real world. It leads, moreover, to such inconsistencies as, for example, granting irreality to feature films while denying it to scientific films. Let us dwell on this example emphasised by Ingarden twice – in 1931 and 1947. Both feature film and scientific film deform reality. Arnheim reasonably demonstrated that every photograph performs a certain transformation of the real material that forms its basis. The characters from the newsreel or from Włodzimierz Puchalski’s film are no more ‘defined’ than, for example, the characters from Andrzej Munk’s *Eroica*, and in this sense are equally ‘irreal’. In both cases, to use Ingarden’s terminology, there is a schematisation of appearances and depicted objects. Thus, from the point of view of intentional existence, they remain in the same dimension. Meanwhile, the feature film is indeed different from the scientific film and the source of this difference is the fictionality of the former. Ingarden convincingly analyses it in detail in his 1947 article. In this view, however (i.e. as a pretence of reality, *als ob*), it has nothing to do with intentionality, and by no means leads to the thesis that the work does not stand in any relation to objective reality. On the contrary: artistic (film) fiction results precisely from the function of signifying, which Ingarden does not recognise in art.

Thus, none of the basic theses are critically examined: the film work does not consist of appearances, depicted objects and events, nor is it intentional or irreal. Are, therefore, Ingarden’s conclusions regarding the specificity of the film work correct? First, it should be made clear that these conclusions do not arise solely from Ingarden’s assumptions. A lot of film theorists, either starting from different philosophical premises or lacking any such argumentation, have written extensively about the dynamic visibility of cinema as its dominant feature, about the greater appearance of reality in film than in other arts, and finally about its polyphonic character. So even if one rejects Ingarden’s basic theses, it does not mean that his detailed conclusions regarding the specificity of film are unfounded. And vice versa: if these individual conclusions turn out to be false, it does not mean that Ingarden’s aesthetic system should be questioned in its entirety. What is more, I am convinced that it is possible to derive from Ingarden’s aesthetic system other specific features of film art, not yet listed by Ingarden himself. Therefore, when considering his individual conclusions, we can treat them somewhat independently of his concept. After all, they are, and have been for a long time, a common property of theoretical film thought.

All three of the film-specific features mentioned here are partly correct. With that said, the feature of dynamic visibility dates to the silent film period, while the other two came about more from considerations of sound film. The first argues for a sensualist conception of cinema, while the others can defend this conception as well as an intellectualist one. These are not contradictory theses, but they rather complement each other. After all, cinema that wants to fulfil an ideological function can do so with the dominance of images. This was also the case with the best works in the history of Soviet film. So, if I write that Ingarden’s conclusions are only partially correct, I have something else in mind.

Even accepting all three of the film’s singular features listed here as mutually complementary, we do not get a satisfactory answer. Each thesis immedi-
ately gives rise to a counter thesis. We say: the dominance of visibility, but is this a necessary condition for a film to be a film, and a valuable one at that? Next to Carl Theodor Dreyer’s *The Passion of Joan of Arc*, after all, one could place Fridrikh Ermler’s *The Great Citizen* or Sydney Lumet’s *Twelve Angry Men*. There – counterpoints of close-ups, here – clashes in dialogues. They are simply different films. We go on to say: a maximum semblance of reality. But is this a necessary condition to talk about film art? In addition to the works of French populism or Italian neorealism, we recall the fantasy of Georges Méliès, or the abstract rhythms of Hans Richter, or finally the symphonies of colours and sounds in the works of Norman McLaren. So, it is not film contra anti-film, but different variants of the same art. Finally, we say: maximum polyphony, because film is a borderline of many arts. But was silent film less cinematic because it was adjacent to music or opera? Some argue the opposite: that it was more cinematic then.

Other even stronger arguments support the idea that Ingarden’s conclusions are only partly correct. If a contemporary of Leonardo da Vinci were writing the *Paragone* of the 20th century and wanted to include film art, he would have to see the work on the film set and on the editing table. Ingarden stipulates that he is talking about an already finished film work, projected on the screen. This objection, from the point of view of the singularity of film art, does not seem convincing. It is true that some contemporary aestheticians, such as Benedetto Croce and Robin George Colingwood, defend the thesis that art and the technical craftsmanship associated with it are two completely different phenomena and that only the former is the subject of aesthetic enquiry. However, there is an old aesthetic tradition, dating back to the Greeks, according to which art is a skill (*technē*). Contemporary artistic theories, in line with the views of the ancient Greeks, do not place technique beyond the boundaries of aesthetic enquiry. This issue is relevant for film art. Singular features of film are already manifested in the craft. A screenplay is written differently from a novel or a play in that it will be translated into a storyboard. The cooperation between the director, the cinematographer, the actors and the technical crew on the set is unlike the work of a writer, painter or sculptor, or of a theatre company. The problem of cinematographic technique is resolved in this phase of creative work; and it is impossible to speak of its characteristic features without expertise and analysis of the technical elements that underlie the specific construction and specific reception of film art. The second creative phase is film editing. Without asking the question: what kind of editing? and receiving an exhaustive answer — it is not possible to move on to a further analysis, concerning the finished product projected on the screen. Ingarden focused on it, but did not pose the problem that has repeatedly returned in my discussions of his theses, i.e. what genre of film are we dealing with and, depending on that, what layers can be distinguished in it? *Paragone* by no means ends with this phase. An analysis of the mechanism and conditions of the perception of the film work (psychology of the cinema goer) and a sociological analysis of the cinema are just as necessary as a consideration of its technical aspect. Sociological issues are particularly important: they include the study of the economic conditions of the creation of a film work, its distribution, its acceptance or rejection, the convergence or divergence of aesthetic judgements, the consolidation of the judgement...
of its value. Indeed, film art is defined not only by the features visible in its structure, but also by its genetic and functional factors (cinema as mass communication).

If my remarks are correct, then the author of a factual study of the singularities of film art can only be a team of specialists dedicated to this issue. The study of these peculiarities must be multi-faceted and multi-phased, i.e. appropriate to the genesis, structure, reception and social function of the work presented on the screen. The efforts of the scholars associated with the Filmological Institute in Paris have gone in this direction – sensibly and with good results. As in any enquiry into an artistic discipline, the proper research path in this field leads from the pondering of the filmmakers themselves through a detailed theory of art to the generalisations of aesthetics. Film theory can and should balance the development of film art. However, it cannot impose itself a priori on specific canons, related to its peculiarities, which film art would not be allowed to exceed. This living, developing art creates artistic laws discovered by its theory. If the theory creates them for art, it usually hinders its development. Similarly, film theory provides material for general aesthetics, which, using its findings, can conduct interesting comparative studies. However, it is not good when the situation is reversed. Film theory can be inspired by an aesthetic system, but this system should not take over its role.

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The attempt presented here to critically respond to Ingarden’s statements about film is, in fact, concerned not with the value of his aesthetics, but with the legend created by his supporters. They claim that in Das literarische Kunstwerk and in the second volume of Studia estetyczne [Aesthetic Studies] one can find sensational theses on film art and a Polish theoretical school can be established because of them. I have tried to demonstrate that such beliefs are unfounded. What is more, I believe that Ingarden did not intend to give anything more than what he already gave – that is preliminary proposals for the study of film against the background of other arts. In juxtaposition with his excellent studies devoted to literary, musical and painterly works, his remarks on film are secondary. Therefore, at the end of this article, it is necessary to emphasise that the inspirations that can and should be drawn from Ingarden’s aesthetics have not yet been used by film theory. From every serious humanistic system, a film theorist can derive theses that are useful for his scientific apparatus. Recently, Lewicki analysed Juliusz Kleiner’s theory from this point of view. Ingarden’s aesthetic outlook is particularly open to encounters with film art. Regardless of the interpretation of an artistic work as an intentional creation composed of specifically understood “layers,” a film theoretician will find several ways that can make an analysis of his research subject easier. Ingarden’s system is extremely rich in ideas, well innervated, that is it considers almost all basic aesthetic problems, and is rich in solutions that, even if they are not acceptable, show the right way to look for them.

His analyses of the structure of a literary, pictorial and musical work are a basic tool for anyone who would like to investigate a musical, pictorial or “literary” film (i.e. one literally translating a novel onto the screen, as in the case of Sergey Gerasimov’s And Quiet Flows the Don). It is enough to compare Ingarden’s
comments with Arnheim’s paper “A New Laocoön: Artistic Composites and the Talking Film” or with Étienne Souriau’s lectures *Filmologie et esthétique comparée* to see that the Polish philosopher excels in this problem thanks to his scholarly precision and deep knowledge of other artistic disciplines.

In the analysis of learning about a film work (its identity, concretisation, the very process of watching, hearing, being moved and understanding), Ingarden’s already completed works are a starting point that can and should be extended during research to include socio-historical aspects. In the light of Ingarden’s proposals, I find it particularly fruitful to examine the identity of a film work: how it changes from script to storyboard, from storyboard to the form in which it appears on the screen, and then how it undergoes modifications depending on the viewing conditions, on the viewer’s psyche, on the atmosphere of the audience, on the historical moment. What will finally remain from this analysis as an identical phenomenon?

Ingarden’s considerations on content and form are also suitable for direct application in the field of film studies. He provides many different solutions demonstrating how the meanings of the terms used shift. It would be worth considering whether it is possible to define such content and form that could be applied to both fiction and abstract films, or whether these concepts should be differentiated depending on the genre. This is not only a problem of film art. However, there would be a problem specific to it: does the script constitute the content of the film work which is its form? The four types of relationships between content and form distinguished by Ingarden (actual, essential, functional, harmonic) can be directly related to research on film style and means of expression.

This is not a complete review of film issues which reading Ingarden’s aesthetics leads to. I deliberately did not take up this problem here, since it is a job for a professionally trained film theoretician who would not continue Ingarden’s suggestions contained in his remarks on cinema from 1931 and 1947, but rather rethink in their own way Ingarden’s entire concept reaching in it for what is most valuable for the current filmological research. If such work had been carried out, Ingarden could, in the future, return with greater benefit and success to synthetic considerations about film art based on the results of detailed research and verified by artistic practice.

Transl. Artur Piskorz


8 Ibidem, pp. 155-156.


11 Ibidem, pp. 414-424.


13 “...das einzige konstituierende Material bilden hier die rekonstruierten visuellen Ansichten...” Ibidem, p. 334.


15 In Morawski’s text there are natural echoes of the genreology used by Roman Ingarden that takes into account essentially three ‘genres’: artistic film (de facto feature film), i.e. the proper object of study contrasted, in various contexts, with abstract film (here Ingarden owed a huge debt to Karol Irzykowski as the author of *The Tenth Muse*) and a group of terms encompassing contemporary documentary genre (scientific film, informative film, newsreel and, in Ingarden’s own words, “reportage” film and “journal” film). [Supplementary explanation provided by Rafał Koschany.]


17 “...nur Phantome sind, die erst durch entsprechende subjektive Operationen als Erscheinungen der dargestellten Gegenständlichkeiten gedeutet werden müssen...” Ibidem, p. 333.

18 Correction: R. Ingarden, “Le temps...”, op. cit. [Supplementary explanation provided by Rafał Koschany.]


20 Ibidem, p. 303.

21 Ibidem, p. 306.

22 Here, Stefan Morawski refers to the forms of word presence outside the diegesis in artistic sound film negated by Roman Ingarden. That is all kinds of subtitles and, hiding under the term of ‘announcer’, all kinds of voices in the function of commentary or voice over narration. [Supplementary explanation provided by Rafał Koschany.]

23 Well, what is important for the word in film is that it is spoken and structured in such a way that its expressive function becomes very efficient, that it becomes close to a gesture, and at the same time its meaning is as if condensed, succinct. R. Ingarden, *Studia estetyczne*, op. cit., p. 308.

24 In one passage Ingarden even states that without the interplay of music, a film work would be flawed, as it only potentially determines this temporal organisation by its own visual means. This statement is at odds with the thesis that a film work is inherent in its own ‘musicality’. Ibidem, ss. 312-313.


26 Apart from the theory of montage which only appeared in Poland in the 1930s.

27 In 1933, *Kwartałnik Psychologiczny* [The Psychological Quarterly] published Leopold Blaustein’s dissertation entitled “Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego” [“Facts on the Psychology of a Cinemagoer”] which was also influenced by Ingarden’s theory. The author drew attention to imaginative experiences. According to him, they testify to the intentional character of a film work, and to the specific conditions of film perception resulting in the viewer’s complete immersion in the world presented.

28 The term ‘populism’ (or, as it is often used in the history of film, ‘French populism’) came...
into film terminology from literary theory and practice where keywords were formulated by L. Lemmonier and A. Thérive, while the most prominent novelist was E. Dabit. In the film context: a term for a trend that was distinguished on the basis of a distinctive theme (the everyday lives of simple, humble people from urban and working-class backgrounds) and artistic technique (realism in the broadest sense; sometimes, due to the softening of certain naturalistic extremes, narrowed down to the concept of neo-naturalism). This current included selected films by R. Claire (e.g. Under the Roofs of Paris, 1930) or M. Carné (e.g. Hôtel du Nord, 1938). [Supplementary explanation provided by Rafał Koschany.]

29 It was precisely the absence of speech that made the silent film develop a style of its own, capable of condensing the dramatic situation... This had led to a most cinegenic species of tale, which was full of simple happenings and which, with the coming of the talking film, was replaced by a theatre-type play... Quoted in R. Arnheim, Film as Art, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1958, p. 229.

30 See: Z. Czeczot-Gawrak, „Narodziny filmologii” and „Filmologia współczesna”, Kwartalnik Filmowy 1958, no. 2 and 1958, no. 3.


32 See: R. Spottiswoode, A Grammar of the Film, Berkeley 1935; K. Reisz, The Technique of Film Editing, 1952 (Polish translation published in 1956); B. Lewicki, “Podstawowe zagadnienia budowy dzieła filmowego”, in: Zagadnienia estetyki filmowej, Warszawa 1955. In the latter work, Lewicki uses a clear, convincing division, according to which sequences are divided into montage phrases, which in turn are divided into shots; montage is the overriding element, building up the smaller wholes and the whole film work. In 1935, meanwhile, appearances were promoted unexpectedly to the signs or words of the film, while the objects depicted were to be its expressions (op. cit., s. 17).


34 R. Ingarden, „Le temps…” op. cit., pp. 299-301.

35 See: footnote no. 28.

36 Film, however, has had a significant impact on other artistic fields. Temporal simultaneousness was introduced into the novel, the dynamisation of space associated with different temporal aspects into the theatre using a revolving stage or a ‘framed’ staging. Therefore, today the problem of the peculiarities of film art is presented differently than in the era of Chaplin’s first films. See: A. Hauser, The Social History of Art, Alfred A. Knopf New York, 1951.

37 Kwartalnik Filmowy 1957, no. 4, pp. 3-17.

38 Revue Internationale de Filmologie 1952, no. 10.

39 It should be emphasised that accusing Ingarden of formalism is based on a complete misunderstanding. It is one of the contra-Ingarden myths, just as pernicious as the myths opposing them.

40 Kazimierz Budzyk, in his article “Problemy metodologii badań literackich” [“Problems of the Methodology of Literary Research”], (Przegląd Humanistyczny 1958, no. 3) accuses phenomenology of being purely speculative, thus questioning the value of Ingarden’s aesthetic system for historical and theoretical literary research. There seems to be a misunderstanding here. If one wants to derive a specific programme of detailed research from Ingarden’s ontology, one will be disappointed. On the other hand, if in the course of one’s scientific work, starting from artistic facts one uses Ingarden’s ideas, the results can only be fruitful for both, literary and film studies. The strength of Ingarden’s aesthetic system is not its concreteness, but its inventiveness in posing questions and often accuracy in constructive proposals. Budzyk’s judgement about the speculative nature of Ingarden’s system should therefore be corrected; Ingarden, digging from the other side of the same tunnel, eventually meets up with those who started from the opposite, empirical side.
Born 1921, died 2004. Internationally renowned Polish aesthetician and philosopher, participant of the Warsaw Uprising, student of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Władysław Witwicki, Julian Krzyżanowski, educator of several generations of scholars in various fields of research. Morawski, in his academic career, was affiliated with several institutions: from the late 1940s with the Jagiellonian University; from 1954 with the University of Warsaw (he was removed from the University for political unreliability in March 1968); from 1970 with the Institute of Art (Polish Academy of Sciences), and from 1988 again with the University of Warsaw. Morawski was editor-in-chief of the journals Estetyka [Aesthetics] (later Studia Estetyczne [Aesthetic Studies]) and Polish Art Studies at various times and in various capacities. Initially, he dealt with selected aspects of Marxism; later with the history of world and Polish aesthetics, eventually focusing on researching 20th-century artistic avant-garde. One of the most important initiators and propagators of postmodern thought in the Polish humanities. Author of many key publications such as Rozwój myśli estetycznej od Herdera do Heinego [Development of Aesthetic Thought from Herder to Heine] (1957), Studia z historii myśli estetycznej XVIII i XIX wieku [Studies in the History of Aesthetic Thought of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries] (1961), Między tradycją a wizją przyszłości [Between Tradition and a Vision of the Future] (1964), Absolut i forma. Studium o egzystencjalistycznej estetyce André Malraux [Absolute and Form: A Study of the Existentialist Aesthetics of André Malraux] (1966), O przedmiocie i metodzie estetyki [On the Object and Method of Aesthetics] (1973), Na zakręcie: od sztuki do po-sztuki [At a Turn: From Art to Post-Art] (1985), Główne nurty estetyki XX wieku. Zarys syntetyczny [Main Currents of 20th Century Aesthetics: An Outline] (1992), Niewdzięczne rysowanie mapy... O postmodernie(izmie) i kryzysie kultury [Ungrateful Map-Drawing... On Postmodern(ism) and the Crisis of Culture] (1999). A considerable section of Morawski’s output was published in foreign languages. His theoretical and critical interest in film was very intense, especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when he wrote regular film reviews in, among others, Gazeta Krakowska. Over time, he published on film less frequently, though he continued to do so until the closing years of his intellectual and writing activity. Morawski left only one popular publication on film (Jak patrzeć na film [How to Look at a Film], 1955) that retains traces of his inspirations of the time, presenting himself as a true cinephile who wanted to “talk to the audience” in this way.
Słowa kluczowe: Roman Ingarden; historia teorii filmu; fenomenologia; estetyka; swoistość filmu; badania porównawcze

Abstrakt
Stefan Morawski
Ingardenowska koncepcja sztuki filmowej
Przedmiotem rozprawy są dwa teksty Romana Ingardena poświęcone filmowi: krótki fragment książki O dziele literackim z 1931 r., zatytułowany Widokisko kinematograficzne („film”), oraz niezależnie opublikowany w 1947 r. większy szkic Kilka uwag o sztuce filmowej. Dzieło filmowe ujmowane jest w nich w całym systemie fenomenologicznej teorii sztuki, porównywane do innych dzieł (np. teatru czy malarstwa), przede wszystkim zaś do literatury, z którą dzieki wspólne cechy warstwowości i intencjonalności. Stefan Morawski rekonstruuje ten system, a następnie zadaje pytanie o miejsce filmoznawczej refleksji Ingardena na tle światowej teorii swego czasu. W konkluzjach wybrzmiewa, że o ile nie stanowi ona oryginalnych rozpoznaw, o tyle w znaczący sposób wpłynęła na dalszy rozwój filmoznawstwa (zwłaszcza w Polsce) i zawiera szereg inspiracji do dalszych badań. (Materiał nierecenzowany; pierwodruk: „Kwartalnik Filmowy” 1958, nr 32, s. 17–32).